The dominant theme of this blog, “Arguing the Operational Environment,” has been to establish the importance of understanding the full range of sociopolitical and ethical factors that compose the environment wherein we apply military force to accomplish military and political objectives.
This appreciation requires first an understanding that while we–as a military force–develop objective-strewn lines of effort and lines of operation to realize desired end states, so too are many other agents in the environment crafting strategies to realize end states. Moreover, other systems, whether human, man-made, or natural, also exert various types of accidental and intentional agency on the battlefield, and it is the naive officer who presumes that, if we do everything according to plan, the probability of success is in our favor. It is a simple fact that our campaign plans tend to depict only us (the military force) and them (the adversary or, what is more questionable, its center of gravity), thereby leaving it to the officers’ and our Unified Action partners’ imaginations or surprise to see what else might disrupt our campaign plans.
This appreciation requires also that, if we are to operate in the midst of nonmilitary/sociopolitical factors, then professional military education should contribute to the cultivation of this understanding. Hence, I advocate for a closer relationship between scholars and military professionals, particularly during the time that military professionals are in school. Civilian scholars are writing every day about the sorts of factors and operations that we–as troopers–must consider and execute. However, we–as military professionals–seldom, if ever, consult these literatures relating to interstate war, civil wars, insurgencies, ethnic conflict, humanitarian interventions, economic development, etc.
General Odierno, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, has a piece in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that is relevant to some of the foregoing themes. He explains how we–as an army–must posture ourselves with respect to (a) smaller budgets, (b) pivoting to the Pacific, and (c) a broader mission set. His opening paragraph is:
After six months as chief of staff, I can see clearly that the coming decade will be a vital period of transition for the U.S. Army. The service will have to adjust to three major changes: declining budgets, due to the country’s worsened fiscal situation; a shift in emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region; and a broadening of focus from counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and training of partners to shaping the strategic environment, preventing the outbreak of dangerous regional conflicts, and improving the army’s readiness to respond in force to a range of complex contingencies worldwide.
I encourage you to read the entire piece. For now, I post three excerpts of relevance to the theme of my blog. The question to keep in mind as you read the excerpts is: To what extent is our military doctrine-focused PME contributing to an in-depth appreciation of the factors General Odierno describes below?
(i) “The army will also make sure it firmly embeds one of the most costly lessons it has learned over the last decade: how to deal with the challenge of hybrid warfare. In the future, it will be increasingly common for the army to operate in environments with both regular military and irregular paramilitary or civilian adversaries, with the potential for terrorism, criminality, and other complications.”
(ii) “Advanced technology and the information revolution have fundamentally altered the battlefield. Now, any activity a soldier undertakes can rapidly evolve into a combination of combat, governance, and civil support missions, and any individual, military or civilian, can alter the trajectory of an operation with the push of a button on a cell phone.”
(iii) “Finally, the army needs to prepare for doing many different things well. In addition to combat of all kinds, possible operations in the next several years will include everything from helping victims of a flood to restoring order in a collapsed state with large-scale criminal activity, violence, and perhaps even unconventional weaponry.”
Tino
Celestino Perez, Jr., Ph.D.
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Strategist
Assistant Professor/DJIMO
Seminar Leader: ILE Scholars Program on the “Local Dynamics of War”
One Comment on "General Odierno’s Article in Foreign Affairs"
Today’s Army is already postured for the next decade of what is to come. It seems that every few years we find ourselves in the midst of a “vital transformation” and we find that the future is potentially something similiar to what we last experienced, or we are sorely ill-prepared for what is just around the corner.
The adjustments our force will make as a result of budget cuts, new technology, and the unkown future operations, are nothing our Army hasn’t faced in previous generations. All to often the solutions are to change or update our doctrine, revise the education and training, and to bolster cooperation and integration from outside the force. These are things that our Army has done, and will continue to do, regardless of the environment we find ourselves in.
The continued update of our doctrine can actually be an impediment to how our force is postured for the future. The only certainty of what our force will face in the future is that the threat is uncertain. To update doctrine as a result of recent experiences can lead to preparedness for the wrong fight. Doctrine should be a guideline for how we intend to employ our forces, not a prescription for how to fight. The continuous update of our doctrine can lead to confusion, can lead to a checklist mentality, and can obfuscate junior leaders in the periods of change. Our doctrine should be vague and descriptive that can be applicable across all spectrums and in any environment. This allows for the doctrine to be more enduring, and it allows for commanders to utilize the initiative and creative thought that is (or should be) inherent to them.
Our professional military education (PME) is already considered, by most, to be “top-notch” and accounts for the changing environments. No other organization as large and diverse as the U.S. Army applies as much resources into the training and professional development of its leaders. Obviously, it is good to continuously work to improve upon what we already do, but at what point can we say that we have this thing right?
Our Army is part of the Joint Force, and works alongside its military partners very well. The cooperative efforts our leaders demonstrate with other agencies and non-Army entities is fairly comprehensive. Like our PME, this is something that we do pretty well, and should continue to develop, but at what point do we admit that we are a success at this?
Yes, we as an Army are in a transition period, but we also need to admit that our force is already pretty impressive and that we already account for the factors the CSA mentions. The typical solutions are already in place, and although continued development of doctrine, PME, and relationships are needed; we shouldn’t try to reinvent the whell and attempt drastic changes that could lead to a less prepared force.