Army IW Center Web Seminar Invitation, Civil-Military Advising and Assisting in OEF-A, 19 September

The Regional Command – East CJ9 Office will provide a discussion of civil military operations – and how they apply to the OEF Advise and Assist mission in the RC-East area of responsibility.   Observations and lessons, while taken from RC-East, can be useful in other AORs.

This brief is targeted for deploying units and will address CIV-MIL Integration with Afghan forces and their Afghan civilian counterparts. Unit leaders and personnel will be able to download the briefing and ask questions during the webcast.

This brief is Thursday, 19 Sep 2013 at 1000 CDT (1100 EDT, 1500 ZULU).  Seminars are recorded and available on Defense Connect Online-S for access by units as desired.

This is a classified briefing. For webcast URL and link to briefing charts, write AIWC at usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil. Requires classified access to SIPR.

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Army IW Center Web Seminar, Targeting in OEF-Afghanistan, 5 September

AIWC hosted a classified webcast presented by ISAF Joint Command Future Operations Office (Targeting Synch). The purpose was to provide an overview of targeting at the operational level and to give insight into future targeting for the ISAF Joint Command. Topics included: Targeting Linkages, Attack the Network, Priorities, the Targeting Cycle, Transition Between Operations, Target Sharing, and the Way Ahead, to include transitioning targeting functions to the ANSF. Personnel from twenty-two stations participated in the webcast.   To learn more, download the slide-deck, or to listen to the broadcast contact the AIWC at usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil. Requires classified access to SIPR.

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Army IW Fusion Center Webcast, Mr. Haider Mullick, No Country for All Men, 4 April 2013

AIWFC hosted a public webcast featuring Mr. Haider Mullick, a Provost Fellow at Tuft’s Fletcher School and a Lecturer at the Naval Post Graduate School (LDESP program). Mr. Mullick provided a highly informative briefing on the insurgency situation in Pakistan, the government’s response, and some of the underlying factors that help insurgents in dividing the country. He began by noting that that the situation in Pakistan regarding non-state armed groups (vice the term “insurgents”) is not simple, but instead highly complex. You cannot neatly categorize all groups into “al Qaeda” or “the Taliban.” The complexity of the situation is important to understand because the response by the Pakistan government and its military should be judged within this context. In the last twelve years, Pakistan has learned to not only clear areas of insurgents, but to hold the areas to prevent the return of insurgent groups. This is a good practice. Mr. Mullick discussed the dramatic rise in civilian violence in Pakistan and the causes for it, which were the result of four major factors. One is the lack of identity. Nationalism, ethnic-centricity, and sectarianism preclude most Pakistanis as identifying themselves first as a Pakistani. In spite of this, he noted there are reasons for optimism and opportunities. One has to do with lessons that were learned by the military in 2009 and that are now preserved in doctrine and training, and civil-military experiences. The elections next month are also a ray of hope for the people. Next, Mr. Mullick talked about Pakistan and US relations – that they are unique, in that both nations “can’t live with or without you.” Both nations need each other to achieve national objectives, so complete divorce is off the table. Mr. Mullick concluded by asking “where do we go from here?” The best answer, he said, is a “measured quid pro quo.” He recommends that there be trust, with verification. To learn more, download the slide-deck or to listen to the broadcast at this link.

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Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Newsletter, March 2013

Written by sanfordsheaks on April 8, 2013 in Army Irregular Warfare Center BlogNo comments

From the Director

One thing that good leaders do when assuming responsibility for an action, activity, job or command is to research it to death. Can you relate to this? To really know a subject you must study everything about it to gain situational understanding. Some call this issue immersion. In fact, we have immersed ourselves here at the IW Fusion Center about the subject of irregular warfare. Here is one shocking conclusion: the term itself lacks clarity, as any review of the definition of IW will show that it is defined in MANY ways.

It was a term first coined by the Marines in their 1940 Small Wars Manual and has been restated and changed to things like low intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, partisan warfare, military operations other than war, etc. Additionally, there is much variance in the activities that comprise irregular warfare. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (Dec 08) lists five activities: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, stability operations, and unconventional warfare, but other literature and guiding documents list many other activities. Consider these official documents and testimony:

• QDR, 6 Feb 06: 4 IW activities
• JFCOM IW Special Study, 4 Aug 06: 10 IW activities
• BG Otis statement to HASC, 27 Sep 06: 8 IW activities
• ADM Olson testimony to HASC, 27 Sep 06: 5 IW activities
• IW JOC 1.0, 11 Sep 07: 14 IW activities
• FM 3-05.130, Sep 08: 14 IW activities
• DoDD 3000.07, 1 Dec 08: 5 IW activities
• JP 1, 20 Mar 09: 7 IW activities
• IW JOC 2.0, 17 May 10: 11 IW activities

Yes, this is confusing – not only for the Soldiers and Marines who must execute it, but also to the “generating force” who have to develop IW doctrine and training and education. Our aim is to help the Army and others in the Joint Force create a coherent strategy for irregular warfare. As a result of our immersion and study, we will publish a monograph on irregular warfare which includes a robust discussion about what comprises IW with recommendations for a way ahead. See this link for detail on the various definitions here. In the meantime, tell me what you think on the AIWFC blog or send us an email.

Thanks for your service.

COL Nestor Sadler, Director

To view the rest of the AIWFC Newsletter, click this link.

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Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Webcast, Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 14 March 2013

Written by sanfordsheaks on April 1, 2013 in Army Irregular Warfare Center BlogNo comments

 

Dr. Chris Paul of RAND Corporation recently completed a follow-on study to Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency (published in 2010 by RAND and sponsored by OSD/CAPE). “Victory” reported results from 30 insurgencies worldwide completed between 1978 and 2008. The new study, Paths to Victory: Lessons From Modern Insurgencies, considered 41 new cases and included almost 300 factors from 90 studied previously. During a webcast with AIWFC on 14 March, Dr. Paul described his research and many findings from his analysis relevant for doctrine, training and education. He and his research team sought to identify what COIN factors are strongly correlated with success from the end of World War II forward. In the first study, the research identified a “scorecard” of both good and bad practices. The new study confirmed the same practices and added some new ones, for a total of 15 good practices and 11 bad ones. After conducting the research of each case studied, the team was able to determine that if a COIN force had more positive practices than negative ones, that they won. The data showed this correlation “perfectly” for every one of the 59 cases. The analysis also revealed some other interesting conclusions. Some critics of COIN hypothesize certain things, such as if the primary COIN force is an external actor, that the insurgents will always win (such as the US assisting in Afghanistan and Iraq). The data did not reveal that, but instead showed that there was little to no correlation for that hypothesis. RAND will publish the study in the next few months, but to learn more, download the slide-deck or to listen to the broadcast at this link on the AIWFC: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/AIWFC/COINCenterEvents.asp

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Pat Bremser Webcast

AIWFC
hosted a public webcast featuring Mr. Pat Bremser who spent a year advising the
Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior in the Islamic Government of Afghanistan
(GIRoA), Kabul. The MoI is responsible for over 40% of all Afghan Security
Forces (ANP, AUP, ABP, ANCOP) and their recruitment, training, and assignment.
During the briefing, Mr. Bremser described the US ministerial advising program
in Afghanistan and provided observations relevant for current and future
operations. He also discussed successes and challenges he experienced in his
deployment to include police force recruiting, training and assignment, as well
as population registration, passports and visas, and the establishment of the
electronic national ID card. Mr. Bremser is a training analyst for the Army SFA
Proponent office in the Army IW Fusion Center. He served over 26 years in the
Army before retiring in 2010. A recording of the webcast, as well as the
briefing slides, summary and participant log are located on the AIWFC public
website (see here).

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Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Newsletter, January 2013

Written by sanfordsheaks on February 4, 2013 in Army Irregular Warfare Center BlogNo comments

 

There are official studies, analyses, assessments, programs and working groups that aim to bring unity of effort of irregular warfare activities within the Department of Defense. With respect to the Army, there are many organizations tasked with managing various irregular warfare activities, but are the efforts linked, nested or mutually supportive?

Does the Army lack unity of effort to effectively integrate, synchronize and institutionalize IW activities?

Is there a need for the Army to develop a coherent approach that synchronizes and integrates DOTLMPF functions for IW activities?

Should there be a single Army proponent for IW?

AIWFC is researching these questions and many others like them in order to establish a foundational framework that will allow us to inform/recommend a unified way ahead for the institutionalization of IW activities across the Army.

We must not rely on “good-enough” when it comes to capturing and capitalizing on the lessons of the last eleven years of operations – the Army must get this right and not fall into the syndrome that we will never do this (IW) again. Our enemies will not give us the choice.

What are your thoughts? Please comment on our blog or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

Thanks for your service.

COL Nestor Sadler, Director

To view the rest of the AIWFC Newsletter, click this link.

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Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Webcast 8 Jan, COIN Strategy, Theory and Practice by 4th BCT/82d Airborne Division

Written by sanfordsheaks on January 14, 2013 in Army Irregular Warfare Center BlogNo comments

AIWFC hosted COL Brian Mennes, currently assigned as a War College Fellow with the Institute of World Politics. He commanded 4th Airborne Brigade Combat Team (Task Force Fury), 82nd Airborne Division in Zharay and Maiwand Districts, Afghanistan from February to September 2012. During the webcast COL Mennes described the preparations his units took to conduct counterinsurgency operations and also the progression of operations from 2002 to present. 4/82BCT in particular emphasized building “Unified Command Teams” and putting Afghan security and civil organizations in the lead. This in turn led to increased security and stability within village clusters and sub-districts throughout the area of operation. To view the webcast and download a summary and other webcast products, see this link on the AIWFC website.

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What We Learned From the Afghans — Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Webcast

Written by sanfordsheaks on December 21, 2012 in Army Irregular Warfare Center BlogNo comments

AIWFC conducted a webcast on 17 December presented by Major Fernando Lujan, currently assigned as a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) with a focus on counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense and counterterrorism. He is an Army Special Forces officer and is serving in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program where he rotates between duty in Afghanistan and assignments teaching, writing, and informing policy. During the presentation, MAJ Lujan described the AfPak Hands program and the reasons it was developed, first of which was to improve continuity of US/Coalition forces with Afghan partners. ISAF was also seeking to fix the lack of truth about the situation “on the ground” with US/coalition units and in the Afghan military/civil government. ISAF created the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team – Afghanistan to act as a directed telescope for the ISAF Commander. CAAT-A members would also act as coaches/mentors/facilitators for US and Afghan units. MAJ Lujan discussed other topics to include a phenomenon he described as “the resource curse;” reasons for increased green-on-blue incidents; Afghans in the Lead; and the success of the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police program. MAJ Lujan concluded the webcast with a robust question and answer period.

Download the summary, slideshow and other webcast products here.

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Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Newsletter, 30 November 2012

Written by sanfordsheaks on December 4, 2012 in Army Irregular Warfare Center BlogNo comments 

From the Director

Our colleague Phil Smith over at the USMC Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare recently reviewed the book, Arms of Little Value: The Challenge of Insurgency and Global Instability in the Twenty First Century (see here). He notes on Small Wars Journal that the author, G.L. Lamborn is explicit about the lack of understanding of the nature of irregular warfare in America. Lamborn states that “The American society, along with civilian and military leaders remain unprepared to deal with the complexities of insurgencies and small wars.”

Phil Smith writes: “Lamborn peppers his book with poignant questions, in a manner expected in a seminar, framed to educate through cognitive dissonance. What is our response to the overwhelming historic fact that conventional forces have usually outnumbered irregular forces 30-40 times but rarely ‘defeat’ the insurgents politically or strategically? Where in our PME for leaders and planners is the dedicated study to small wars? Why do so many of our leaders still think that firepower, massive force and high technology are keys to winning in small wars? Which of our adversaries present an existential technological or conventional threat to the USA?”

Phil goes on to show that we in America (and especially the US military), “even while we have been engaged in many small wars we have yet to institutionalize, or commit to philosophy and organizational memory the national, strategic and tactical lessons.”

From a national level, it is vital for civilian leaders in the security apparatus to themselves understand history and the nature of irregular challenges so they can properly weigh the advice of their military counterparts when irregular threats and challenges arise. From a military readiness standpoint, it is even MORE important for soldiers to maintain a satisfactory level of knowledge of small wars – to be ready when given the task to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations, stability operations, or security force assistance operations.

Thoughts? Please comment on our blog or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

Thanks for your service.

COL Nestor Sadler, Director

To view the rest of the AIWFC Newsletter, click this link.

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