It was winter time in Afghanistan and very cold. There were good intelligence reports of small pockets of Taliban resistance occupying the general area. Reports also showed unconfirmed IED-making cells might inhabit the patrolled area. Our company had taken IED strikes very seriously as we lost four troops within a six month period in three separate attacks. The sharpest platoon leader in the company called the company commander to tell him they had detained a man while on patrol. Based on bomb making material found on the scene, the platoon leader believed the detainee could provide valuable information on the IED network. He completed his report by telling the company commander they were beginning battle field interrogation.
The detainee provided little to no valuable information after an hour of questioning. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant believed the detainee had valuable and fleeting information on a target. Since they were running out of time, the platoon sergeant told the Lieutenant he knew a sure-fire way to make the detainee talk without “hurting” him. He assured the Lieutenant this technique would certainly yield information and they would not be going totally outside of the Rules of Engagement (ROE). He influenced the Lieutenant by appealing to his sense of loyalty to and grief for those Soldiers they lost and the “need” to destroy this IED cell. The Platoon Leader walked away. The Platoon Sergeant was a highly regarded and decorated Soldier and a consummate professional. When he spoke, everyone listened.
The Platoon Sergeant procured a 55-gallon drum, had his troops take it outside, and filled it with water. When asked by some of the younger privates what he planned, the Platoon Sergeant said “This technique has worked in the past, it will certainly work again.” One of the privates felt uneasy about what was about to transpire next but continued to fill the barrel with water when the Platoon Sergeant told him to remember his fallen comrades. The Platoon Sergeant took the detainee fully clothed and submerged him in the water up to his neck; he could still breathe. The Platoon Sergeant knew eventually the cold water would take effect and the detainee would talk. The Lieutenant returned and saw what was happening. He pulled the Platoon Sergeant to the side and clarified this technique did not fit into the ROE. The Platoon Sergeant stated, “We are not going to let him freeze to death but merely make him uncomfortable.” He again reminds the Platoon Leader of the troops they lost. The Platoon Leader, after a moment of reflection, admits to himself he knows they are close to tracking this IED cell down. He then gave the Platoon Sergeant a nod and walked away. Only minutes later the detainee began to talk. He offered valuable information which led the entire Company to a house where they killed six insurgents and caught a High Value Target.
What would you do as the Platoon Leader? When the company commander finds out what happened, what should he do?
One Comment on "Merely Making the Detainee Uncomfortable"
May 4, 2009 5:33 PM MAJ Parrish said:
It is very easy to look at the results of the battlefield interrogation technique (6 insurgents KIA & 1 HVT captured) and suggest that the payoff was worth the risk. There is no doubt that future risks to coalition forces were prevented.
I think this warrants a cautious evaluation of our junior leader development. At some point, the PSG came to the conclusion that his technique would work, and sometime after that, successfully implemented it for the first time. Therefore, his success made it easier to convince his PL that he would be successful again. It’s a shame that the PL chose to walk away. Isn’t a PL responsible for the actions of his/her platoon? Particularly when phrases like “doesn’t violate the ROE” and “not illegal” are voiced. Those types of phrases demand a critical evaluation.
I would like to believe that I would have had the leader presence to prevent the battlefield interrogation from taking place. An infantryman (and most other branches) is not properly educated to conduct any kind of interrogation. That is left to specific MOSs. I had the opportunity to operate a detention facility, and even the interrogators were closely scrutinized and routinely evaluated to ensure compliance with doctrine, the Law of Land Warfare, and detainee handling procedures.
Platoon leaders and young lieutenants need to be warned that they will be tested in many ways. The opportunity to lead the best Soldiers and non-commissioned officers in the world can be marred by a decision to look the other way or “trust” the individual who appears to know it all.
The company commander has an obligation to report the interrogation technique to his higher headquarters commander. Everyone in the chain of command must know and understand the approved methods for battlefield interrogations as well as the prodecure for expediting the insurgent to a holding facility where he can be immediately questioned by a trained interrogator. Thinking through the worst-case scenario, the insurgent could have had a sudden heart attack and died in the 55 gallon drum. At that point, it wouldn’t be the PSG who is in the hot seat.
Proper training could prevent a mess of future problems. There is no room for relaxed standards when everything we say and do can be quickly broadcast around the world.
April 19, 2010 3:02 PM Brian Fiddermon said:
Is it in the best interest to change the current DOD policy of “DON’T ASK DON’T TELL”