Mass murders are shocking no matter who commits them, or where they happen. In the United States, shock and outrage are typically followed by several days or weeks of mass media attention, and the country rallies behind the victims and their families.
After the mass murder in Kandahar on 11 March, there has been comparatively little talk in the States about the tragic event, or the fallout that is sure to follow. On a major news network this morning, more airtime was devoted to how the Republican presidential candidates handled the topic of grits during their campaigning efforts in the southern states.
So what does it matter? This event took place in Afghanistan, a place most Americans know little about, and where no Americans were killed in the process. Some might even consider it something that just happens in war from time to time. So should the American public really concern themselves with lengthy conversation about this mass murder, or should the news networks devote valuable airtime to the story?
There are those in the world who have taken great interest in this event. The Afghan population is talking about it. The Taliban is talking about it. The Afghan government and our allies are talking about. A mass murder of women and children committed by an American Soldier is the equivalent of an information operations JDAM for the insurgents we have been fighting for more than ten years.
So now I pose these questions. Does the apparent apathy on the part of the American public have an impact on operations in Afghanistan? If yes, what is that impact? Dose the US counterinsurgent, in context of the whole of government approach to include the DoD, DoS, USAID, etc., have a responsibility to shape the perceptions of the US population in regards to counterinsurgency operations?
Dan Lawrence, The Counterinsurgency Center. This statement is my own and does not constitute an endorsement by or opinion of the Department of Defense.
5 Comments on "How Do You Deal With A Mass Murder In A Counterinsurgency Operation?"
I do believe there is a level of apathy when it comes to the American public. News about OEF has rarely made the major network evening news lately, if at all, unless the POTUS, VPOTUS or SECDEF makes an unnanounced visit. That’s too bad, but understandable. Little public support plus nealy 12 years of war in the same small country virtually guarantees back page news unless something major happens. This incident did make the headlines, but quickly, I would argue “went away.” Given a good bit of the hard work we have done over 10+ years was just undone by a SSG in 15 minutes or so, at least we understand the implications.
First, I would like to state that the you may be comparing apples and oranges. The title, “How Do You Deal With A Mass Murder In A Counterinsurgency Operation?” is different from gaining popular support from the U.S. population for COIN. Since I have noted this inconsistency, I will address both questions.
Dealing with a mass murderer and any atrocities committed while conducting COIN should be swiftly investigated for the facts. Those facts should be used against this person in a court of law and let the chips fall as they will. The circumstances regarding the attack are of no concern of the enemy or the foreign population. It is very important to send the message to the foreign population that these acts are not acceptable and our swift action in dealing with the situation will reflect our country’s stance. A hard stance against these actions is important because the Center of Gravity in a COIN fight is the populace. Act against the populace whether intentional or not was a major IO win for the enemy.
Does the US counterinsurgent have a responsibility to shape the perceptions of the US population in regards to counterinsurgency operations?
I would ask the question; does the US population need to be reminded of the reason why we are in Afghanistan? Although rhetoric, some seem to have forgot. The reasons why is that there was a direct attack on our national vital interests (security) on 9/11. Information is provided to the US population by way of the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review. Fact is that the shaping operations should occur but it is the individual responsibility of the population to formulate opinions themselves. Last thought, most shaping operations occurs through the media, which unfortunately has their own agenda, which is not always compatible with the message that the government is trying to deliver.
Does the US counterinsurgent, in context of the whole of government approach to include the DoD, DoS, USAID, etc., have a responsibility to shape the perceptions of the US population in regards to counterinsurgency operations?
This is a DANGEROUS question…
The perceptions of the Host Nation’s people, not the American public; are the “center of gravity” for a counterinsurgency campaign. (Perhaps a chicken and Egg argument…)
Messaging is extremely important in a COIN campaign. Without a solid messaging capability (I/O, PSYOPS, PA, etc…) we are at the mercy of insurgent propaganda. Thus, it is the responsibility of every counterinsurgent to associate a positive message with each and every action. But let’s be clear about this responsibility: These messages should be shaped to appease local populations’ perceptions–NOT domestic ones.
When the US Military begins to ask its own warfighters to justify their actions to the American public we are in despair! This is the job of strategic planners and congressional decision-makers–and they need to do their jobs.
Recommeded read – two documents available from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI):
- Mass Atrocities Response Operations
- Mass Atrocity Prevention & Response Options.
Does the US counterinsurgent have a responsibility to shape the perceptions of the US population in regards to counterinsurgency operations?
Absolutely! The American public is the coalition’s center of gravity. Lose support of the public, and congress will soon follow. Next thing you know the President is announcing a withdrawal timeline. Oh snap, didn’t that already happen?